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ABSTRACT 
 This paper is focused on settling the debt crisis in a member state of the 
Monetary Union (for instance, Greece) and it presents the arguments that the 
settlement for overcoming the debt crisis must rise out of its causes. They are 
present both in the weaknesses of the Monetary Union’s functioning and the 
irresponsible behaviour of the government in the country. Therefore, the resolution 
must endanger neither the euro nor the stability of the country. It is unacceptable 
the resolution which can help the crisis to be overcome smoothly (by writing off the 
debts) if it violates the relations in the euro zone and if it endangers the future of 
the single currency. The burden of overcoming the crisis has to be borne both by 
the debtor and the creditors according to their “merits”. In this context, the author 
has elaborated the achievements of the pro and contra austerity measures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 What is characteristic about the numerous discussions and comments on the 
debt crisis in the eurozone, especially in Greece, is the fact that in most of the cases 
the economic and political aspects of the problems have been analyzed separately. 
This leads to drawing unilateral conclusions about the causes of the crisis and the 
way of overcoming it. When it comes to the causes of the debt crisis and the 
weaknesses of the euro, it is given a dominant significance to the incomplete and 
inconsistent model of introducing a common currency (a unique monetary system, 
with no common fiscal policy)4, which leads simultaneously towards “building” debts 
in separate countries and surplus in others, and to sharpening their 
interrelationships as a result of the internal contradictions. There are practically no 
opposing opinions on this. But, albeit this fact has been acknowledged, there are 
observations which attach a greater importance for the outbreak of the debt crisis 
to the irresponsible behavior of the political ?́?lites in separate countries, and to their 
non-compliance of the contractual criteria for the functioning of the Monetary Union. 
However, when it comes to the way of overcoming the debt problems in separate 
countries in the eurozone (particularly in Greece) and saving the euro, not only as 
a common, but as an international currency, in the past few years there have been 
crystallized two economical views (that means solutions irrespective of the political 
dimension of the problem) – pro and contra austerity measures. It was also 
presented a new option not long ago.5 
 In a more detailed elaboration, it will be pointed out the achievement of the 
pro and contra austerity measures so that the unilaterality of solutions can be seen. 
                                            
4 The problem was perceived even before the introduction of the common currency. Milton Friedman 
wrote: „The drive for the Euro has been motivated by politics not economics. The aim has been to 
link Germany and France so closely as to make a future European war impossible, and to set the 
stage for a federal United States of Europe. I believe that adoption of the Euro would have the 
opposite effect. It would exacerbate political tensions by converting divergent shocks that could have 
been readily accommodated by exchange rate changes into divisive political issues. Political unity 
can pave the way for monetary unity. Monetary unity imposed under unfavorable conditions will 
prove a barrier to the achievement of political unity. “(Milton Friedman, The Euro: Monetary Unity 
To Political Disunity? Project Syndicate, Aug 28, 1997) 
5 „Greece was offered two stark choices: Leave the eurozone without financing, or remain and receive 
support at the price of further austerity. But Greece should have been offered a third option: Leave 
the euro, but with generous financing “(Arvind Subramanian, How the IMF Failed Greece, Project 
Syndicate, AUG 13, 2015). This wasn’t requested by the debtor, and it was not commented by the 
creditor. They probably consider it as unattainable.  
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Furthermore, it will be pointed out the role of the common currency of the member 
states in the eurozone in order to be seen that the membership in the Monetary 
Union is not a daily, but it is a long-term interest to whose realization it has to make 
a contribution each member state. Finally, it will be highlighted that a permanent 
solution of the debt crisis has to be searched in the elimination of the complex of 
causes that has led to crises in separate countries of the eurozone and the euro.  
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PRO AUSTERITY MEASURES 
 The essence of the pro austerity measures as a solution to the debt crisis in 
Greece consists in the fact that the debtor has to pay off the finances borrowed 
from the creditor without any concessions. The debtor has to repay as much as he 
borrowed with the agreed interest as it is, actually, the case for the majority of 
countries. Therefore, the debt has to be paid off in a way that corresponds to the 
obligations which the country has as a member state of the Monetary Union, due to 
the fact that the country gets into debts by acknowledging itself which means for 
paying off the debt are available to it.  
 By having accepted the euro as its own currency, Greece, actually, 
determined the way of overcoming the external imbalance of the country. Thus, it 
agreed to abstain from the opportunity to solve the issue of the price 
competitiveness of the national economy by devaluating the national currency, 
because it accepted the euro as its own currency. This means that it has accepted 
to maintain the price competitiveness either by increasing the production, and/or 
by lowering the prices of the products and services, by lowering the amount of 
salaries, pensions and the income received on other bases, by reducing the 
ponderous and ineffective administration, i.e. by increasing the unemployment… 
These are all measures which reduce the expenses in the work of the economic 
subjects, thus increasing their competitive ability at the foreign markets, and in this 
way providing a bigger inflow of finances for paying off the debts. These are 
measures (of “internal depreciation”) which essentially realize the effects of 
devaluation that can be carried out in a country having its own currency due to the 
fact that the process of devaluation stimulates the export, and it discourages the 
import. The difference can be seen in the fact that the measures of “internal 
devaluation” put some deflationary pressure on the member state’s economy, 
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whereas the nominal devaluation puts some inflationary pressure on the value of 
the national currency. In the first case, the burden of the debt’s repayment falls 
basically upon the users of public debt (budgetary users) and upon the taxpayers 
(if the taxes rise), whereas in the second case, the burden falls upon the whole 
population because of the more expensive import and the increase in repayments 
in the national currency due to the credit indebtedness towards the foreign 
countries. The final objective of both approaches is to bring into balance the 
economic relations of the state with the foreign countries, which presents a 
condition for achieving a maintainable development for a longer period of time and 
for paying off the debts on time.  
 Here, it should be taken into account that in a complete Monetary Union (with 
a unique currency and a common fiscal policy), the member states do not have a 
concrete obligation to bring into balance their economic relations with the foreign 
countries in order to achieve an external balance in the union and stability of the 
euro exchange rate. This is the case with the US which does not take care about 
that. It is the duty of the Treasury and the Federal reserves.  
 Why is the implementation of the measures of “internal devaluation” formally 
and legally suitable for the countries in the eurozone when they get into a debt 
crisis?  
 The defense of the austerity measures in the countries of the eurozone which 
have fallen into a debt crisis arises from the established rules of the functioning of 
the Monetary Union. The Maastricht Treaty obligates the member states not to 
surpass the limit of the budget deficit more than 3% annually, and the public debt 
– not more than 60% of the GDP. This means that all the countries which have been 
brought into a situation of not being able to fulfill their liabilities to the creditors 
because of having surpassed the already mentioned limits should bear all the 
consequences of their own behavior. They will have to gather up their strength in 
order to provide finances for paying off the mature debts on time, regardless of the 
price that should be paid for that, because they had to contemplate about it when 
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they borrowed and spent foreign finances. It is well-known that a good share of the 
borrowed finances was spent irrationally i.e. unproductively.6  
 How did it happen to the Greek government to have surpassed the limits in 
the budgetary expenditure and in the increase of the public debt nearly twice in 
spite of their determination? 
 In the response to this question it should be looked for the most suitable way 
of overcoming the debt crisis in Greece and the crisis of the Monetary Union and 
the euro.  
 It is evident from the previously mentioned that the arsenal measures of 
internal devaluation are inevitable in the Monetary Union. In the concrete case, it 
should not be implemented only such kind of measures because it is unfair the 
debt’s burden to be borne only by the debtor. Nevertheless, it is normal the bigger 
part of the debt to be borne by the debtor. And how big it will be that part, depends 
on the amounts that the member states of the eurozone are ready to write off and 
on the financial support they want to provide in order to reconstruct the economy. 
The bigger they are, the better for the country because they improve the starting 
position of the Greek economy in overcoming the crisis (they spare the indebted 
country from even tougher austerity measures). However, if both the amounts of 
debts that have been written off and the amounts of resources for financial support 
are lower, then the debtor country takes the responsibility of providing the initially 
required level of competitiveness by implementing more intensive measures of 
internal devaluation (by reducing salaries, pensions, prices etc), and appropriate 
structural reforms.  
 It is a fact that the austerity measures are suitable for acquiring a position of 
a member state in the European Monetary Union. However, when bringing up a 
solution for the debt crisis, it should not be underestimated the fact that the member 
state has accumulated so big debts that it is not able to pay them off due to the 
weaknesses and defaults within the functioning of the union. For that reason, a part 
                                            
6 “Rather than describing current government spending as “austere,” it would be more correct to 
view it as an end to years of fiscal profligacy, culminating in 2013, when the government’s budget 
deficit reached 12.3% of GDP and public debt climbed to 175% of GDP.” (Edmund S. Phelps, What 
Greece Needs to Prosper, Project Syndicate, AUG 6, 2015).  
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of the debt’s burden should also be borne by the other members. How big it will be, 
depends on the mutual contract, and on the objective evaluation of their guilt about 
the accumulation of debts.  
 By justifying the implementation of austerity measures for overcoming the 
debt crisis in Greece, it has been emphasized the necessity for maintaining the 
euro’s value and for disciplining the member states to keep to the rules for 
functioning of the Monetary Union. Within the persistence of those measures, it can 
be seen an opportunity for increasing the credibility in the euro, and there is a 
warning that the disobedience of rules is not worth at all. The debtors have to pay 
off the debts due to the fact that their socialization is unacceptable among the 
subjects in separate countries, and it cannot be sustained within the current model 
of organization and functioning among separate countries in the eurozone. It is not 
a coincidence that some of them contradict to the propositions for writing off debts 
by giving reasonable and comprehensive arguments. It is important to find out a 
way how to assist the countries which receive higher income nowadays (salaries, 
pensions …) and which have a more favorable status of some social structures 
(because they were previously financed by credits they are not able to pay off now) 
in relation to some members of the eurozone which have proportioned their work 
and life with their own achievements. Can the union exist if it is tolerated and 
supported the practice of living by the sweat of other men’s brows? 
 
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONTRA AUSTERITY MEASURES 
 Whereas the supporters of the austerity measures for overcoming the debt 
crisis in Greece (and the other countries in the eurozone) are form the European 
countries which are more developed, the opponents are numerous and they are 
present in most of the countries. The Americans are the ones who are predominant, 
especially the Nobelists Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz7 and other prominent 
economists such as Jeffrey Sachs, Kenneth Rogoff, Ben Bernanke... The IMF has 
                                            
7 They even suggested that at the referendum, the Greek citizens should commit themselves against 
the proposition for saving Greece form bankruptcy, being based on austerity measures and financial 
support of structural reforms. (Joseph E. Stiglitz, Europe’s Attack on Greek Democracy, Project 
Syndicate, Jun 29, 2015; Paul Krugman, Greece Over The Brink, The New York Times, June 29, 
2015) 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE DEBT CRISIS IN A MEMBER STATE OF THE MONETARY UNION 
AND IN A COUNTRY HAVING ITS OWN CURRENCY 
_________________________________________________________________ 
83 
 
changed its attitude towards the austerity measures in terms of Greece, despite the 
fact that it hasn’t evaded those measures in disciplining the authorities of the 
countries falling into “a fundamental imbalance” for decades. There is no 
explanation if it is an exception or whether it will be implemented in other countries 
in future. Or, maybe, it is easier to criticize the austerity measures when it comes 
to a country which is a member of the eurozone and there is someone who can bear 
part of its debt’s burden (by writing off credits and by reprogramming debts with 
lower interests), thus enabling it to overcome the recession and to service its 
liabilities to the foreign countries (and of course, to the IMF as well). The fine idea 
of saving the euro is used as an argument although it is problematic to achieve that 
if there has been set a precedent of “painless” or less painful resolution for the debt 
crisis in the countries of the eurozone. Isn’t it, on one hand, “a condition” for 
spreading “the disease” called irresponsible indebtedness of the other countries in 
the eurozone, and on the other hand, “a condition” for granting credits in a relaxed 
way. However, this approach is not a way of strengthening the euro. It’s the 
opposite of that.  
 Nominally, the opponents of the austerity measures for overcoming the debt 
crisis in Greece have a soundly scientific and economic guarantee, but not in the 
concrete case of the debt crisis in Greece. First of all, the debt is enormous and 
more projections indicate that it cannot be paid off by implementing austerity 
measures (which have been brought down to measures of internal devaluation) 
because they endanger the dynamics of the growth and sharpen the social tensions, 
and at the same time the opportunities for servicing repayments. Afterwards, it has 
been stated that the country as a member of the eurozone, having the euro as its 
national currency, does not have any opportunities for using its own monetary policy 
for overcoming the debt crisis, including here the policy of the exchange rate and 
devaluation as a measure for improving the price competitiveness of the domestic 
production at the foreign markets. By determining “the object of analysis” in a way 
like this one, it has been stated the Keynesian argument: an economy in recession 
cannot recover itself if the macroeconomic policy undertakes austerity measures 
because by doing so it reduces the consumption, thus affecting the dynamics of 
economic growth and it also decreases the opportunities for servicing debts. The 
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way out is possible only if the consumption increases. For Krugman: „It’s astonishing 
even now how blithely top European officials dismissed warnings that slashing 
government spending and raising taxes would cause deep recessions, how they 
insisted that all would be well because fiscal discipline would inspire confidence. (It 
didn’t.) The truth is that trying to deal with large debts through austerity alone — 
in particular, while simultaneously pursuing a hard-money policy — has never 
worked. It didn’t work for Britain after World War I, despite immense sacrifices; why 
would anyone expect it to work for Greece?“8 
 However, the credibility of this argument does not correspond to the case of 
overcoming the debt crisis in Greece. The Keynesian attitude refers to the way out 
of Great Depression of the developed national economies (1929-1933). He solved 
the problem of insufficient demand which had arisen either because of the 
insufficient propensity to consumption or because of the unfavourable allocation of 
income within the national economies (increase in inequality).  
 As a result of this, it has appeared the necessity for the economies to save 
money in a period of flowering in order to have finances for stimulating the 
consumption in a period of crisis. The Greek crisis is not a crisis of overproduction. 
In fact, it is a crisis which has emerged as a result of the excessively unproductive 
and extravagant spending of finances it does not possess, but which were borrowed 
under conditions when the member states of the Monetary Union didn’t have a 
mutual responsibility or at the level of the Union (from a fiscal union) in order to 
service the national debts as debts of the Union. Therefore, in this context, by 
increasing the spending the exit from recession makes itself look like a treatment of 
an alcoholic with more alcohol.  
 It is understandable that the intention of the authors of contra austerity 
measures is to provide a more favourable and sustainable solution so that Greece 
can get out of debt crisis. It is a fact that the Greek economy is not able to pay off 
the enormous debts it has been accumulating for a longer period of time to the 
creditors. This means that it has to be made a decision about reducing the Greek 
debt by writing it off and/or by reprogramming permanently the liabilities with 
                                            
8 Paul Krugman, Europe’s Impossible Dream, The New York Times, July 20, 2015 
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favorable interests, and about bringing it down to such a level where it can be 
serviced along with the projected economic growth of the country. If this won’t be 
fulfilled, the Greek cannot overcome the debt crisis. The settlement of the crisis will 
be only postponed for a while if the opportunities for repayment are not properly 
measured.  
 The economic logic of this approach is undeniable, but it cannot resist the 
economic and political considerations emerging from the possible precedent of such 
a decision in the relations of the eurozone. This will raise questions which are not 
obviously in favour of the justification and coverage of the irresponsible 
indebtedness of the Greek authorities in the past period.9 Furthermore, by taking 
up austerity measures some member states of the eurozone (Portugal, Ireland, 
Latvia, Estonia) and others (Iceland), have managed to recover their economies for 
a period of few years. It turned out that despite the austerity measures, it is possible 
an economic growth, but with significant casualties.  
 
THE ROLE OF THE COMMON CURRENCY FOR A MEMBER STATE IN THE 
MONETARY UNION 
 As the supporters of contra austerity measures have been trying to find an 
optimal solution at all costs (including the debt write-off and the withdrawal from 
the euro), they have overlooked the role of the common currency for a member 
state in the Monetary Union, not taking into consideration the fact that the countries 
join the union in order to accomplish some long-term economic and political 
objectives.  
 For the national economies in the eurozone, the euro represents a currency 
with a single and stable rate giving such effects as those of the country’s policy of 
a single, stable and real rate of exchange in the systems of fixed exchange rates. If 
it is real, that rate of exchange leads towards bringing into balance the economic 
relations of the state with the foreign countries, it instigates the economic growth 
under conditions of stability, and it intensifies the involvement in the international 
                                            
9„ Austerity is thus the result of policy makers’ past inability to take timely decisions, in other words 
it’s the result of their short sightedness – and stupidity “ (Lorenzo Bani Smaghi, Austerity and 
Stupidity, Vox CEPR’s Policy Portal,  06 November 2013) 
  
SETTLEMENT OF THE DEBT CRISIS IN A MEMBER STATE OF THE MONETARY UNION 
AND IN A COUNTRY HAVING ITS OWN CURRENCY 
_________________________________________________________________ 
86 
 
labor division. The already mentioned effects are also carried out in the eurozone. 
Despite the fact that separate countries can be deficient in terms of the currency, 
the eurozone will be in a state of balance if it is led a policy for maintaining the real 
value of the common currency in the Monetary Union, and that can be achieved 
with the floating exchange rate of the euro. It can be stated form this point of view 
that there is no difference in the way of leading a macroeconomic policy between a 
country which is a member of the Monetary Union and which accepted the common 
currency as its own, and a country which has its own currency with a fixed rate of 
exchange according to one of the leading currencies. The difference is the fact that 
the member state of the Monetary Union has no opportunity for implementing 
depreciation and it is forced to use measures of internal devaluation, whereas the 
country with its own currency has such an opportunity. However, the difference 
vanishes if it doesn’t use that opportunity. The relations between these two 
countries and some foreign ones can be brought into balance by taking measures 
of internal devaluation, in the first country by force (because there are no other 
opportunities apart from leaving the common currency), and in the second one 
consciously and voluntarily (because the government believes that the effects of the 
eventual devaluation of the national currency will be more unfavorable than the 
ones of carrying out the process of balancing through measures of internal 
devaluation).  
 The aim of the policy on maintaining a single, stable and real rate of 
exchange is to achieve a more rational involvement of the national economies with 
their own currency or of the joint ones in the Monetary Union with a common 
currency in the international labor division. In both cases, the macroeconomic 
policies of the countries have to pay attention to keep an account of maintaining 
the exchange rate single, stable and real (the reality in the international regime of 
floating exchange rates is provided by offering and demanding the currency at the 
foreign exchange market). This is not a problem for the eurozone. The euro presents 
a currency with a single rate of exchange for all member states and all sectors of 
the member states’ economies, and on the basis of that there has been carried out 
a rational labor division among the national economies in the eurozone, and at the 
same time in the global economy.  
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 By joining the eurozone the member states expose themselves to conditions 
of improving the competitive ability of their economies either by constantly 
increasing the labor productivity or by lowering the expenses in the process of 
working. They don’t have the chance to use the manipulation of the exchange rate 
in order to improve the competitive ability of the national economy. Therefore, the 
stagnation of labor productivity and/or the country’s extravagant spending worsens 
the position of the national economy in terms of the union’s average, whereas the 
will and insistence of the government to improve the population’s living standard 
(in order to fulfil the election promises) leads towards indebtedness in other 
countries. However, if the credits are not used rationally, the country gets into debt 
crisis because it starts servicing the payment of mature liabilities by providing new 
credits.10  
 An advantage of the member states of the Monetary Union (if it is followed 
by a fiscal union) is the fact that they don’t have any dilemmas how to improve their 
competitive ability. Only real economic moves are at their disposal: they will either 
increase the productivity and/or reduce the expenses. In contrast with them, the 
countries with their own currency are often exposed to pressure of improving the 
economy’s competitive position by increasing its price competitiveness, and by 
devaluing the national currency. However, this is not an advantage. In fact, it is a 
result of making insufficient efforts for maintaining the reality of the exchange rate 
by increasing the process of innovation, the labor productivity and the profitability 
of working.  
 In a different context, this kind of elaboration of the currency’s role of a 
member state of the Monetary Union and of a country with its own currency poses 
a question about the way of resolving the debt crisis in Greece. Greece is a member 
                                            
10 In this context, the results from the evaluations of economic benefits of the economic and 
political integration are indicative. They are negative only for the Greek „Using the synthetic 
counterfactuals method, we estimate how GDP per capita and labour productivity would have 
behaved for the countries that joined the European Union (EU) in the 1973, 1980s, 1995 and 2004 
enlargements, if those countries had not joined the EU. We find large positive effects from EU 
membership but these differ across countries and over time (they are only negative for Greece). 
We calculate that without deep economic and political integration, per capita incomes would have 
been, on average, approximately 12 percent lower.“ (Nauro F Campos, Fabrizio Coricelli, Luigi 
Moretti, Economic Growth and Political Integration: Estimating the Benefits from Membership in 
the European Union Using the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method, 
www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9968) 
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of the union with rights and obligations towards the other member states of the 
eurozone, and with a full responsibility for its own development under the conditions 
of the euro’s functionality. After it had joined the Monetary Union, it couldn’t choose 
the way of solving its debt problem. The choice of interventions for increasing the 
competitive ability of the national economy (either by increasing the labor 
productivity and/or by reducing all kinds of expenses – measures of internal 
devaluation) is restricted. It is excluded the opportunity which the countries with 
their own currency have it in hand i.e. improving the price competitiveness of the 
export-oriented economy by carrying out a devaluation. However, they bear all the 
consequences arising from its unsuccessful implementation, especially from falling 
into the well-known vicious circle of depreciation and inflation. After all, the aim of 
joining the Monetary Union (and maintaining a fixed rate of the national currency in 
relation to a currency which has an international role) is to turn the interest of the 
national economies of making a bigger profit towards taking economic measures, 
and not towards measures for distribution of the national income (as it is the 
devaluation).  
 
THE SOLUTION FOR GETTING OUT OF DEBT CRISIS HAS TO ARISE FROM 
ITS CAUSES 
 The settlement of the debt crisis in the eurozone, especially in Greece, has 
forced to be carried out a fundamental search of the functioning of the European 
Monetary Union and the euro as a common currency. There can be found the 
reasons for the outbreak of the debt crisis. The cause cannot be evaded while 
searching for a permanent solution for overcoming the crisis because if it is not 
eliminated, it will create conditions for breaking out again, but at another place and 
with different intensity.  
 It is a matter of the concept of formation of the Monetary Union, given the 
fact that it is not complete. In spite of the single monetary policy, it has need of a 
mutual and coordinated fiscal policy in order to function effectively (not to mention 
the fact that it also has need of a political union in order to be completely effective). 
This lack has given the member states a great freedom of planning and spending 
the budgetary funds under the conditions of free movement of capital.  
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 The contractual solution which had to compensate the lack of fiscal policy 
coordinated at a higher level has proven itself as not effective enough to bridle the 
appetites of the member states’ governments for spending. Most of them have 
surpassed the contractual limitations on the growth of the budget deficit of 3% and 
the public debt of 60% of the GDP.  
 The breach of contractual limitations has objectively imposed the question of 
subjective (ir)responsibility on causing a debt crisis in the countries of the eurozone. 
No evidence is needed to prove that the eurozone wouldn’t have fallen into a crisis 
of such dimensions and depth if all had held on to the determined limits (not to 
mention the information of “masking” the Greek debt even after the country had 
joined the eurozone). However, it is a matter of question whether the observance 
of those limitations wouldn’t be a restriction of the consumption as a result of what 
the economic growth would be delayed in separate countries and in the eurozone 
as a whole. It is a matter of question whether and how adequate the solution of 
setting similar limitations on the restriction of indebtedness is, regardless of the 
effects which have been achieved with the borrowed funds.  
 In outlining the solution for overcoming the debt crisis in Greece, it has to be 
taken into consideration the irresponsible behavior of the creditors. They have been 
crediting not taking into account the creditworthiness of the debtors. In the race for 
profit, they forgot that the countries can bankrupt although there is no standardized 
procedure. 
 In this context, it is evident that the acute problem of being not able to 
service the liabilities to creditors has to be solved not as a problem in itself (as it is 
the case with Greece), but within the context of overcoming the causes of debt 
crisis in the eurozone for a longer period of time. The solution will be good if it 
manages to provide an effective settlement of the debt crisis in Greece and at the 
same time to generate conditions which will prohibit the practice of irresponsible 
borrowing and crediting, and which will possibly “socialize the losses”. This problem 
undermines both the Monetary Union and the euro. 
 By admitting the objective faults made upon the introduction of the euro and 
the subjective weaknesses (of both the debtor and the creditors) in the functioning 
of the Monetary Union, there are created conditions for overcoming the 
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consequences of the debt crisis in Greece and the uncertainties of the euro’s future. 
The agreement on the objective faults is an assumption of implementing reforms 
which are essential for the consequent functioning of the common currency in the 
eurozone whereas the mutual recognition of the debtor’s and creditors’ faults is a 
basis for establishing a sustainable level of the national debt of Greece in such a 
way that it doesn’t cause any dissatisfaction of the other member states of the 
eurozone.  
 It can be insisted upon paying off the debts entirely, but if the debtor is not 
objectively able to do that, the crisis won’t be settled. In fact, it will be only 
postponed. It is also problematic the insistence upon ceasing the implementation of 
austerity measures and enabling the debtor to pay off the debts by stimulating the 
economic growth, and not by saving which leads to deceleration of the growth. At 
worst the pro austerity measures have been putting off the real settlement of the 
country’s debt crisis (although it has its own price) whereas the contra austerity 
measures can endanger both the union and the euro if they are reduced to writing 
off the country’s debts regardless of the reasons leading to that. Such a solution will 
be quite properly required by the other indebted countries which have already made 
an approach to saving and reforms for overcoming the debt crisis. It is a question 
if there will be such countries that are willing to finance that kind of approach, at 
least until it is not established a fiscal union or achieved a greater coordination of 
the fiscal policies of the eurozone member states. 
 Therefore, it should be kept in mind that the entry in and the exit from the 
Monetary Union is not a matter of a daily interest, but rather of a long-term decision. 
It means that every member state of the Monetary Union has to reassess its 
decisions of joining the eurozone and of undertaking the euro as its own currency 
because the eurozone and the euro are not the only solution for the members’ 
developmental problems, but rather an opportunity (by political and economic 
integration) for a more rational involvement of the national economies in the labor 
division in the eurozone and in the global economy. In accordance with that, they 
will have to lead the developing policy in the country, using the benefits from uniting 
and taking into account the losses it suffers from as a result of the lower level of 
development in relation to the other countries in the integration.  
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CONCLUSION 
       In the process of overcoming the debt crisis in Greece and in the eurozone, it 
was underestimated the complexity of the problem, and there were created two 
different solutions: pro and contra austerity measures (including here and the 
abandonment of the eurozone and the euro).   It is as a matter of realizing the daily 
interests of the member states rather than making a decision for joining the 
Monetary Union in order to realize the long-term interests of each of the member 
states individually and as a part of the eurozone. 
      The way of giving precedence to the liability of repaying debts regardless of the 
country’s objective possibilities and the conditions in which they have accumulated, 
and the insistence on ceasing the implementation of austerity measures because 
they deepen the crisis in the country, are unilateral approaches. However, it has 
been overlooked that the debt crisis is not a natural disaster. In fact, it is an 
occurrence with deep socio-economic and political causes. Without their elimination, 
there is a great possibility for not overcoming the debt crisis. In other words, it can 
be postponed, and it can break out again and definitely endanger the Monetary 
Union and the euro.  
       By entwining the economic and political aspects of the debt crisis in the 
eurozone, it is imposed a more fundamental intervention in the eurozone 
(establishing a political and/or at least a fiscal union despite the monetary one) and 
in separate countries (a consequently marketable behavior including “the 
bankruptcy” of incompetent and irresponsible governments) in order to avoid the 
future crises, and to help the euro continue along the way of enhancing its 
international role. 
      By relying only on the pro and contra austerity measures, there can be satisfied 
some current short-term interests of the actors in the settlement of the debt crisis 
in Greece, but they won’t be functional in terms of the work promotion of the 
European Monetary Union and the further affirmation of the euro.  
     The reasonable solution has to satisfy the justice, and at the same time to open 
space for strengthening the integrative processes in Europe, and the euro in the in 
the intercurrency relation in the world. This means that the burden of overcoming 
the crisis has to be borne by both the debtor and the creditors according to their 
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“merits”. It has to be avoided the enforcement of solution out of the powerful 
position of the creditors having an aim of covering up their responsibility for bad 
crediting, or out of an extortionate position of leaving the common currency in order 
to sustain the rights acquired by credits that the country is not able to pay off.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE DEBT CRISIS IN A MEMBER STATE OF THE MONETARY UNION 
AND IN A COUNTRY HAVING ITS OWN CURRENCY 
_________________________________________________________________ 
93 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Blanchard Olivier (2012), The logic and fairness of Greece’s programme, VOX CEPR’s Policy 
Portal, 23 March 
2. Campos F Nauro , Coricelli Fabrizio , Moretti Luigi , Economic Growth and Political 
Integration: Estimating the Benefits from Membership in the European Union Using the 
Synthetic Counterfactuals Method, 
www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9968 
3. Draghi Mario (2012), Competitiveness: the key to balanced growth in monetary union, 
Treasury Talks ‘A European strategy for growth and integration with solidarity’,  A conference 
organised by the Directorate General of the Treasury, Ministry of Economy and Finance – 
Ministry for Foreign Trade, Paris, 30 November  
4. Friedman Milton (1997), The Euro:Monetary Unity To Political Disunity?, Project Syndicate, 
Aug 28 
5. Krugman Paul (2015), Europe’s Impossible Dream, The New York Times, July 20 
6. Krugman Paul (2015), Greece Over The Brink, The New York Times, June 29 
7. Pagano Marco (2010), Fiscal crisis, contagion, and the future of euro, VOX CEPR’s 
Policy Portal, 15 May  
8. Phelps S. Edmund (2015), What Greece Needs to Prosper, Project Syndicate, AUG 6,  
9. Philippon Thomas (2015), The state of the monetary union, VOX CEPR’s  Policy Portal 
31 August   
10. Smaghi Bani Lorenzo, Austerity and Stupidity, Vox CEPR’s Policy Portal, 06 November 2013 
11. Stiglitz E. Joseph (2015), Europe’s Attack on Greek Democracy, Project Syndicate, Jun 29 
12. Subramanian Arvind (2015), How the IMF Failed Greece, Project Syndicate, AUG 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SETTLEMENT OF THE DEBT CRISIS IN A MEMBER STATE OF THE MONETARY UNION 
AND IN A COUNTRY HAVING ITS OWN CURRENCY 
_________________________________________________________________ 
94 
 
 
